Abstract
1. Introduction

18
The evaluation of transportation systems garners 19 significant attention in the planning, engineering, policy, 20 management, and economics literatures (Kaplan and 21 Norton, 1996; Caltrans, 1998; Pickrell, 1999) . Measures 22 of effectiveness (MOE) include assessments of the effi-23 ciency of the system, as well as its equity or fairness, its 24 effects on the environment, and the qualitative experi-25 ence that users enjoy. This paper addresses efficiency 26 measures put forth by different analysts. Each profes-27 sion approaches the problem differently, with unique 28 concerns and objectives. While each field adopts what it 29 feels are appropriate, none of the current measures 30 corresponds directly with the perceptions of transpor-31 tation users, the perspective of the consumer. As short-32 hand, we can develop a chart to consider several of those 33 perspectives on efficiency:
35
The reasons for the different measures are that their 36 uses vary: planning, investment, regulation, design, 37 operations, management, and assessment are among the 38 aims. Where the traveler fits is not immediately clear, as 39 each profession asserts that it is primarily concerned 40 with the public interest. 41 Engineering textbooks say ''The challenge of the 42 transportation engineering profession is to assist society 43 in selecting the appropriate transportation system con-44 sistent with its economic development, resources, and 45 goals, and to construct and manage the system in a safe 46 and efficient manner'' (Garber and Hoel, 1999, p. 13) . 47 While including economic criteria, the text proposes 48 multiple criteria for evaluation. In general, engineers 49 focus on maximizing mobility (the speed and capacity of 50 the system) and safety, subject to cost constraints, as the 107 may do little good for other components (other links, 108 specific trips, or the network as a whole), and may 109 sometimes worsen them. 110 We also need to distinguish between the normative 111 (what should be) and the positive (what is) when con-112 sidering efficiency measures. For each measure, we need 113 to define a scale across which values are compared. To 114 say that the speed on a link is 50 km/h tells us nothing 115 about whether that is good or bad, it simply is. By 116 comparing the measured speed of 50 km/h to a norma-117 tive standard (for instance, a speed limit), we can then 118 determine whether we have a speeding problem (the 119 speed limit is 30 km/h), a congestion problem (the speed 120 limit is 110 km/h), or no problem. Levinson et al., 154 2004) . While the measures might not align exactly with 155 each profession's current practice, it is hoped that this 156 shorthand will provide insight into the problem of how 157 different measures are, and can be, used. The first section 158 summarizes various measures of mobility that are used 159 to assess transportation. This is followed by an exposi-160 tion of transportation consumer surplus. Similar treat- 
235 This is because delay can be aggregated over an area or 236 trip. A trip-based delay measure would consider both 237 intersections and links implicitly; no distinction would 238 be made as to whether delay was caused by an inter-239 section or a link. A volume-based measure would have 240 difficulty incorporating this.
While transportation engineers most often deal with 242 automobile travel, the mobility and safety of non-auto 243 travel should also be considered. The Bureau of Trans-244 portation Statistics (1999) reports that the automobile 245 currently serves some 89.5% of daily trips in the United 246 States. However, large segments of the population can-247 not drive an automobile for their transportation needs. 248 Foremost are children under the age of 15, which the 249 census estimates at 21.3% of the population. The quality 250 of their transportation depends in large part upon many 251 microscale site planning design issues such as the pro-252 vision of sidewalks, the location of paths and trails, 253 building setbacks, and neighborhood road design which 254 minimizes vehicular speed. 
257
To compare the various classes of measures, we apply 258 them to the same case, the eight-week shut off of Ramp 259 Meters in 2000. Applying some of the mobility to eval-260 uate ramp meters requires measurements at on-ramps, 261 freeway segments and the system as a whole. Total de-262 lay, number of vehicles being delayed, average delay 263 through the whole observation period, and average de-264 lay of each time interval are computed for each ramp. Table 3 . 273 Previous research indicates that ramp meters increase 274 the mobility of freeway networks. On TH-169, with 275 ramp metering, the average travel speed (taking ramp 276 delay into account) of the network increases from 37 to 277 62 km/h; travel delay per km decreases from 82 to 68 s 278 and the average travel time for one trip decreased from 279 610 to 330 s. However, on I-94, the network mobility 280 measures decrease slightly as the result of the ramp 281 meter control. The average travel speed (taking ramp 282 delay into account) of the network decreases from 87 283 km/h (without control) to 79 km/h (with control). Travel 284 delay per mile increases from 27.9 s (without control) to 285 42.1 s (with control) and the average travel time for one 286 trip increases from 285 s (without control) to 299 s (with 287 control). 
290
The economist's perspective on efficiency revolves 291 around the notion of benefit/cost analysis. Benefits to 292 users in public projects can be measured as the sum of 293 the utility accruing to consumers. However, because, 
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294 strictly speaking, utility is not measurable, consumers' 295 surplus is often used. Consumers' surplus is the differ-296 ence between what individuals would pay and what they 297 actually pay. 2 The transportation economist will argue 298 that the sum of the change in consumers' and producers' 299 surplus is the appropriate measure of benefit to compare 300 before and after a widened road, land development, or 301 other change in policy or infrastructure. An economist 302 would recognize each trip between a specific origin and 303 destination at a given time by a given mode for a given 304 purpose, as a distinct market, with its own demand 305 curve. The consumer's surplus is measured in each 306 market with and without the change, recognizing that 307 the number of trips in that market before the change 308 may be higher or lower than the number of trips after 309 the change. The price is the money and time (combined 310 into a generalized cost) required to consume a trip in a 311 particular market. If more people are traveling at the 312 same price, or the same number at a reduced price, or 313 some combination of the two, this is deemed a benefit. 314 This measure is summed across all markets. For any 315 given change, some markets may experience an increase 316 in benefit, others a decrease, and the total may or may 317 not be positive. 318 Fig. 1 shows conceptually how consumers' surplus is 319 calculated within a single transportation market. This 320 illustrates two networks. Network 2 is a net improve-321 ment on network 1, hence the same number of trips can 322 be accommodated at a lower cost (or more trips for the 323 same cost). The consumers' surplus for network 1 is 324 represented as area a-b-e and for network 2 as area a-325 b-c-d-e. The difference, or change in consumers' surplus 326 is the area b-c-d-e. In practice, point a is unknown, so 327 the change in consumers' surplus between two scenarios 328 or networks is more useful than the absolute value of the 329 consumers' surplus. 330
The numerous transportation markets are coupled, 331 that is the demand in one affects the supply character-332 istics of another. Thus, a reduction in cost in one market 333 will increase the demand in that market. That demand 334 will use links shared by other markets, where the supply 335 was not expanded. Moreover an increase in demand in 336 some markets will increase costs and decrease trips in 337 others. A direct benefit accrues to a market where the 338 improved link is used or the improved link is at least a 339 partial substitute for a link that is used. In this frame-340 work, with variable demand, many markets that do not 341 receive the benefit directly will receive a net loss of 342 transportation welfare. 343
The elasticity of demand is generally known near 344 existing price points. In the areas beyond the range of 345 our experience, demand is not known well. This is 346 acceptable in the case of the shifts in the supply curve 347 (e.g. adding a new link), when the unknown areas do not 348 enter the measurement. However, with a shift of the 349 demand curve, the whole range of demand must be 350 known to achieve an accurate measurement.
351 With a consumers' surplus measure, the total change 352 in surplus over all markets needs to be compared with 353 the total costs of the project. In economic analysis, if 354 total benefits exceed total costs, the project is worth 355 doing.
356 Approximating demand as a straight line function, 357 then the following ''rule of 1/2'' describes the net user 358 benefit (change in consumers' surplus) (DCS) in a single 359 market (Neuberger, 1971) :
361 where Q on , Q off flows when the ramp meters are on, off 362 respectively. s on , s off travel times when the ramp meters 363 are on, off respectively. 
365
If the travel time when the ramp meters are switched 366 off is greater, then there is a gain of consumer surplus 367 with metering. Using the same afternoon peak period 368 data as was used above in the comparison of mobility, 369 the change in consumers' surplus is measured. On TH-370 169, the changes in consumers' surplus for each indi-371 vidual segment are summed to get a benefit from 372 metering of 3531 vehicle hours. The loss in consumers' 373 surplus on ramps with metering is found to be 639 374 vehicle hours. As expected, ramp meters significantly 375 reduce the productivity and consumers' surplus of the 376 ramps. The change in consumers' surplus of the system 377 with ramp metering is overall positive, the ramp meters 378 benefit the freeway segments more than they hurt the 379 ramp segments, so an overall positive change in con-380 sumers' surplus of 2893 vehicle hours is recorded. On I-381 94, the net increase in the consumers' surplus of the 382 whole system (including freeways and ramps) due to 383 metering is 481 vehicle hours.
2 Similarly, Producers' surplus (or profit) is the difference between the cost of production and the price of sale; but for goods that are unpriced, e.g. most roads, there is no producer's surplus. 
386
In determining whether to build a project, select a 387 policy, implement a system, or provide a service, it is 388 possible, with the help of many assumptions, to estimate 389 the net present value of the future stream of profit or 390 welfare with a cost/benefit analysis. But because of the 391 assumptions required, benefit/cost analysis may not be 392 sufficient to manage a complex system such as a trans-393 portation network on a day-to-day basis. There is a 394 desire to monitor the transportation network on multi-395 ple dimensions, to understand how well it is performing 396 (and how accurate were previous projections), and to 397 steer future decisions. Metrics might assess how effi-398 ciently labor or capital is employed (to determine where 399 future labor or capital should be employed). They might 400 consider market share against competitors, the state of 401 complementary services (for instance, access to transit 402 or parking in the case of a transit system) or the satis-403 faction of customers and vendors (to gauge future 404 market share and the price and quality of inputs). 405
Productivity is simply a measure of output divided by 406 input. The larger this ratio, the more productive is the 407 system. The key to measuring productivity is determin-408 ing the outputs and inputs. Beginning with the inputs, 409 we have, broadly, capital and labor. Labor includes all 410 the human time required to produce a service. So when 411 considering the productivity of transit service, labor 412 inputs comprise the employees of the transit agency, 413 including bus drivers, mechanics, managers, and 414 accountants among others. (And when considering 415 passenger car travel, the driver's time must be included 416 as well.) Capital includes all the buildings and equip-417 ment needed to operate the service (buses, garages, 418 offices, computers, etc.). Capital may include land and 419 energy, though those are often separated. While labor 420 may go into each of the capital components, to the 421 agency it is viewed as capital (the labor required to build 422 the bus is considered in the labor productivity of the 423 manufacturer of the bus, but not the operator). Labor 424 productivity (P L ) can be measured by dividing the out-425 put measure (O) with hours of labor input (H The question of what is productivity in transportation has several interpretations. One line of research, not followed here, beginning with research by Aschauer (1989) and continuing through Boarnet (in press) and Nadiri and Theofanis (1996) examines how transportation investment affects the economy at large. These papers tend to treat transportation (or highways) as a black box, and make no distinctions between different kinds of transportation investment. The input is state or national investment in transportation, and output is gross domestic product. While this research provides useful rhetorical tools (transportation investments provide an X% return, compared with Y% for other investments) important for large budget debates, it provides no assistance in actually making management decisions. Productivity of public labor (P GL )
Productivity of private labor (P PL )
Productivity of public capital (P GK )
Productivity of private capital (P PK )
Where 
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461 stance. Two effects take place when network distance is 462 shortened. First, there is an immediate reduction of ton-463 km. But there is also a shortened travel time, which may 464 induce more economic activity, trips, and thus ton-km. 465 This paradox can be obviated by looking at point-to-466 point distance rather than network distance as the 467 baseline. 468
Productivity is not of itself a perfect welfare measure, 469 especially since it only addresses the costs of production, 470 not the demand side. However it is an indicator whose 471 changes tend to indicate whether welfare is increasing or 472 decreasing. As emphasized earlier, other gauges may be 473 required to indicate overall welfare. Furthermore, we 474 have only described the productivity of transportation, 475 not the activity system to which all travel belongs. 
477
Productivity is the ratio of the output of any product 478 to the input that was required to produce that output. 479 For freeway networks, vehicle kilometers traveled 480 (VKT) is the main output and vehicle hours traveled 481 (VHT) is the main input. In this case, a partial pro-482 ductivity factor (P ) of a freeway network is equivalent to 483 a measure of network average speed, but is weighted 484 differently than a mobility measure, which would aver-485 age link speeds:
487 The ratio of VKT and VHT is measured for each free-488 way segment and ramps separately and then combined 489 to obtain the productivity of the system for both the 490 metering-on and metering-off cases. Ramp metering is 491 considered beneficial if the productivity with its presence 492 is higher. 493 Table 5 shows productivity, the vehicle kilometers of 494 travel per vehicle hours of travel on freeway segments 495 and ramps. The freeway segments have productivity of 496 102 km/h with metering and 52 km/h without meters. 497 The net productivity of the ramps themselves is 5.76 km/ 498 h with meters and (by assumption) 40 km/h without 499 meters. Combining freeway segments with ramps gives a 500 system productivity measure. The system productivity 501 improves immensely with ramp metering. In fact the 502 percentage increase in system productivity is 64%. For I-503 94, Table 5 , suggests an increase in the productivity of 504 the system by 8.26%. This compares with a drop in 505 speed using the mobility measures. 
508
Accessibility is the measure of the ease with which 509 other pieces of land and their associated activities can be 510 reached (Hansen, 1959; Black and Conroy, 1977; Pirie, 511 1981; Morris et al., 1979) . Weibull (1980) suggests that 512 accessibility is a measure of an individual's ability to 513 participate in activities in the environment. If a trans-514 portation or land use change enables someone to reach 515 activities that are more desirable in less time, then the 516 accessibility (and possibly the value of their land) 4 in-517 creases. However, because accessibility increases with 518 activity, areas with high accessibility often have high 519 congestion. 520 There has long been an interest in the gravity model 521 and in related accessibility measures. In analogy with 522 physics, Reilly (1929) formulated a ''law of retail grav-523 itation '', and Stewart (1948) formulated early definitions 524 of accessibility. The measure of potential is now called 525 accessibility (Hansen, 1959) . Since Hansen's formula-526 tion, the distance decay factor has been updated to a 527 more comprehensive function of generalized cost. The 528 function is not necessarily linear--a negative exponen-529 tial, estimated from models of observed spatial interac-530 tion (such as gravity models), is often used. Geographers 531 define accessibility as suggested in Table 6 (Hanson, 4 Hedonic theory suggests that individuals do not purchase goods, but rather the bundle of attributes composing the good. Someone does not buy a house, but rather the qualities of that house: location (accessibility), size, type of construction, appliances, noise from nearby roads, etc. Every house combines the various attributes slightly differently. Hedonic models are used to pull apart these attributes, and develop demand curves for the various attributes (goods or bads). However, these attributes are interrelated, houses with high accessibility will be more expensive, which will lead to more investment in other attributes, leading to better maintenance and more frequent remodeling.
D. Levinson / Transport Management xxx (2004) 532 1986) . Some other measures relating jobs and workers 533 (or more generically productions and attractions) are 534 also described in Table 6 . Accessibility is illustrated in 535 Fig. 2 , where the propensity is the willingness to travel a 536 certain distance (the longer the distance/time, the less 537 willing you are to travel), the job supply is the cumu-538 lative number of jobs available (which increases with 539 distance/time over which you are searching), and the 540 actual distribution of trips is a product of those two 541 factors. 542
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If one takes jobs as supply, and workers as demand, 543 there are many ways to inter-relate the two measures. 544 Force (used as an accessibility measure in the early lit-545 erature), described in Table 6 , is analogous to the sum of 546 the area formed by the product of supply and demand. 547 The difference (D) between jobs and workers can be 548 viewed as the surplus or deficit in workers at a given 549 travel time away from a point. If for short distances 550 from an individual's house, there is a surplus of jobs, 551 that individual will have a shorter than average com-552 mute, while if there is a surplus of houses, there will be a 553 longer than average commute (Levinson, 1998) . Taking 554 a simple job-worker ratio (R) over some small subre-555 gional geography (Cervero, 1989 (Cervero, , 1996 is clearly a 556 misleading indicator (Giuliano and Small, 1993; Levin-557 son, 1998) . Nevertheless, it may be useful to compare 558 the relative distributions of jobs and housing without 559 falling into a geography trap. A more sophisticated 560 measure would compute the accessibility to jobs and to 561 workers at a point, and take the ratio of these two 562 accessibility measures. It should be noted that accessi-563 bility to housing varies much less than accessibility to 564 jobs. The sum of supply and demand, jobs and workers, 565 can be taken as a net measure of activity in an area, or 566 after dividing by area, as a measure of density. Description Formula Accessibility (A) in zone i depends on the opportunities (e.g. jobs P ) in zone j and the transportation cost s ij between them
Job-worker ratio (R) in zone i at radius r (in transportation cost) is the Jobs (P ) within radius r divided by Workers (Q) within radius r
Density (D) in zone i is the sum of jobs and workers within radius r, divided by the area contained within
Difference (D) in zone i is the difference between the number of jobs and workers in radius r D i ¼ P r i¼1 P i À Q i Force (F ) between zones i and j is the product of the jobs (P ) in zone j and the workers (Q) in zone i and a function of the transportation cost s ij between them 
568
Three different functions of travel time are used; these 569 are described in Table 7 . Freeway accessibility is com-570 puted both with and without ramp metering as in Table  571 6 (top row), where P j , the opportunities at off-ramp j, is 572 measured using exit volumes and the travel cost, s ij is 573 just the travel time between on-ramp i and off-ramp j.
574
Three different accessibility models were applied to 575 TH169. The first is a classic gravity model, the second a 576 model estimated for freeways in the Twin Cities by the 577 author, and the third from a regional gravity model 578 estimated for Washington DC (Levinson and Kumar, 579 1995) . For all three cases on TH-169 accessibility in-580 creases with ramp metering, as shown in Table 7 . 581 However, there may be accessibility functions for which 582 this is not the case. The accessibility measures for I-94 583 are also shown in Table 7 . Unlike TH-169, but consis-584 tent with our mobility measures, these results are mixed. 585 In one of the three cases, accessibility falls with meter-586 ing. 587 6. Travelers: subjectivity and equity
588
A first criticism concerns the measure of transporta-589 tion rather than activities as the base for the MOE. A 590 transportation or land use change that enabled a person 591 to reduce the total number of trips made might be seen 592 as a net loss from a narrow transportation productivity 593 or consumers' surplus measure with trips or person-km 594 traveled as the output measure, or a mobility measure 595 that looked at throughput However if the reduction is 596 because of trip chaining, performing the same number of 597 activities with less travel, the individual may be better 598 off. This argues for a broader measure of utility of the 599 entire activity system rather than simply the demand of 600 the transportation system. Of course, this also requires 601 entirely new measurement methods.
602
A second criticism is of the aggregation error in-603 volved. Supply and demand curves, and consequently 604 accessibility and consumers' surplus measurements, 605 implicitly assume mass produced identical commodities. 606 If the markets are defined coarsely (large zones, few 607 purposes, few or no time slices), the assumption of 608 homogeneity within markets fails. On the other hand, if 609 each individual trip were its own market, supply and 610 demand curves are no longer measures of quantity of 611 exchange, but rather its probability. While the number 612 of coarse markets was large, the number of potential 613 individual transactions is huge. This clearly makes an 614 accurate measurement of consumers' surplus difficult. 615 A third criticism is the absence of the consideration of 616 choice and the existence of non-user benefits in the 617 MOE. If transportation is a derived demand, the activ-618 ities at the end are what count. It can be argued that not 619 only the activities pursued, but also the ones not pur-620 sued, should be considered in evaluation. 621 Further these measures incompletely capture the 622 costs and benefits associated with spillovers and exter-623 nalities. Transportation change enables/requires reor-624 ganization of processes, which provides benefits/costs 625 outside the transportation sector. Particularly in the case 626 of unpriced transportation, it is very difficult to capture 627 these spillover benefits or external costs and internalize 628 them within the transportation sector. 629 The general focus on systematic efficiency ignores 630 equity effects on individual welfare from a change in the 631 transportation-land use system. While at one level 632 everyone understands that change creates winners and 633 losers, at another, only the aggregate net gain is gener-634 ally considered. Much cost benefit analysis is based on 635 the Kaldor-Hicks or potential Pareto improvement test. 636 This says that a change is acceptable provided the losers 637 could be compensated from the gains of the winners, 638 whether or not they actually are. But this test may not 639 command social acceptance, particularly from the los-640 ers. Thus, economic decisions are devolved into the 641 political and legal arenas, where voices are not neces-642 sarily weighted equally. Diffuse winners may not expend 643 energy to defeat concentrated losers, despite an overall 644 ''net gain.'' By the economic calculus, society is worse 645 off. Can this be anticipated and avoided? 646 It needs to be recognized that winners and losers are 647 created all of the time. The simplest changes to the 648 transportation network create winners and losers, not 649 just due to the taking of land, or the creation of pollu-650 tion effects, but even mobility reductions from the rel-651 atively narrow transportation perspective. It is essential 652 to develop MOE (both of efficiency and equity) that 653 identify these issues before they become political prob-654 lem. Unfortunately, no single MOE will capture every- 
